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Abstract
This paper analyzes in a two-country model the impact of students’ mobility on the
country-specific level of higher educational quality. Individuals decide whether and where
to study based on their individual ability and the implemented quality of education. We
show that the mobility of students affects educational quality in countries and welfare in
a very different way depending on the degree of return migration. With a low return
probability, countries choose suboptimally differentiated levels of educational quality, or
even no differentiation at all.
JEL: H77, I22
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1 Introduction
Worldwide we observe a substantial increase in students’ mobility. More and more students
decide to take up higher education in countries other than their home country. Since 1975 the
number of students all over the world enrolled outside their country of citizenship increased from
0.8 million to 3 million in 2007. In OECD countries on average the percentage of foreign of all
tertiary enrollment has risen from 4.9 to 9.6 since 2000. In the European Union the number of
foreign students worldwide as percentage of all EU students went up from 5.3 in 2000 to 7.5 in
2006. Within the EU the share of all students studying in another member state changed from
2 percent in 1998 to 2.8 percent in 2007. Breaking down the figures to the country level, the
number of foreign students in the EU12 countries is between 1.2 times and 2.6 times higher in
2006 than it was in 2000.1
The increasing mobility of students raises the question as to how it will affect the higher
education programs of countries. The formation of human capital is an important factor of
growth in developed economies. Since students are more mobile, countries may compete for
students. Competition may take many forms and the incentives to compete for mobile students
depend critically on various factors such as the degree of return migration after students have
graduated, the financing system, the institutional constraints. In a tax-financed system, if
foreign students return as educated workers to their home country, the incentives of a country to
free-ride on the higher education system of other countries are considerable (see some references
∗We are grateful to Silke Uebelmesser for very useful comments.
1These figures and other trends in students’ mobility can be found in OECD (2009) and Eurostat (2009).
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below). In this paper, we focus on a different dimension by examining competion in the quality
levels of higher education. Quality is privately financed, which leaves aside the standard free
riding problem. This can be understood as a focus on the quality of fee-financed education on
top of a tax-financed basic higher education. Indeed, the introduction or extension of tuition
fees in many countries provides an additional source of funding generated to improve educational
quality.2
Higher student mobility extends the scope of countries to specialize in differing qualities of
higher education. The rationale behind vertical differentiation is that individuals differ with
respect to their innate ability to benefit from higher education. Thus the choice of an education
quality level may be used as a way to attract or to repel individuals according to their ability. The
incentives to do so depend on the government’s welfare criterion.3 To examine these incentives,
we build up a simple game in which the decisions of both students and countries are derived
through well-specified welfare criteria.
The analysis is conducted in a simple two-stage game with two countries At the first stage,
each government chooses the education quality level. The level is restricted to be uniform and
country-specific meaning that it applies to all students in the country. This restriction to a
single educational level is a simplification which does not alter the main results, as discussed
later on. At the second stage, individuals make their decisions about higher education and labor
supply given the quality levels chosen by the governments. Specifically they decide whether and
where to study on the basis of the expected lifetime income in each alternative. The quality
level of education as well as the innate individual’s ability generate the skill-units an individual
is endowed with after having acquired education. Hence, the proposed education levels affect
the individuals’ choices and determine the structure of labor supply in the subsequent period
through two channels: directly because it affects productivity and indirectly because it modifies
the incentives to become skilled.
The welfare criterion of a country is given by aggregate wage income of skilled and unskilled
workers net of educational cost. In general, the welfare function follows the residence principle
by taking account of the residents in the country wherever they were born. However, the degree
of return migration after students have graduated parameterizes the relative weight on natives
and foreigners. The graduates return probability specifies the chances for a graduate student
who has studied abroad to come back in his home country. At one extreme, with a return
probability of unity the welfare function is equivalent to a welfare following the native principle
where the government is concerned only with the natives.
We assume that the students’ ability type are privately known and not observable by govern-
ments. With pure fee-financing, this assumption does not induce distortions in the individuals’
choices because the private benefit and the social benefit of taking up a given educational level
coincide. As a result, in a closed economy, a government that is concerned about its citizens’
welfare chooses the same educational level with or without observing abilities and there is no
welfare loss. Instead, in the case where economies are open and students freely choose where
to study, the fact that ability is not observable plays a central role. Since governments have no
full control on who studies and who works in their countries, the choice of the education level
operates a selection of the students according to their ability. A country may prefer to provide
a high quality of education in order to attract the best students, but at the cost of charging
2Kemnitz (2007) has shown that in a decentralized system of higher education allowing for fee-financing does
not necessarily crowd out tax-financing and yields a higher quality of education.
3Our model has some similarities with models of vertical product differentiation as developed by Gabszewicz
and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982). However, the profit maximizing firms are replaced by countries
whose objective is citizens welfare.
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higher fees to finance better quality hence deterring some students, while the other country may
decide to educate the less able students on a low quality level which can be provided at a low
cost.To assess the relevance, efficiency, and stability of these strategies, we analyze the Nash
equilibria of the game and their welfare properties as a function of the return probability of
foreign students.
Optimality requires countries to differentiate their educational levels as this enables individ-
uals to split according to their abilities. If all foreign students return to their home country
the countries differentiate their educational levels optimally at the (unique) Nash equilibrium.
The intuition is that governements do not compete effectively for students since all graduates
return home. Hence, there is no distortion due to mobility and governments choose the efficient
provision of education. If instead all foreign students stay in the country where they have been
educated we show that at a symmetric equilibrium, the identical educational level is too high
compared with the optimal one. Hence, if countries open up their borders students’ mobility
induces countries to over-provide higher education. The reason is that they compete for the
highly able students. For intermediate values of the return rate, the equilibria result from the
two forces at work: incentives for differentiation called by efficiency gains and incentives to
compete for students. However, even if an asymmetric equilibrium with distinct quality levels
exist, governments tend to be sub-optimally differentiated. This result can be traced back to
external effects resulting from students’ mobility.
Let us discuss now the constraint of a single educational level per country. This constraint
cuts off the possibility for a government to achieve the first best policy which would be to provide
a specific educational level for each ability type of students. Albeit strong, the restriction to
a single educational level reflects the observed limited variability of the quality of educational
programs within a country (at least relative to the variability across countries). Given the
diversity of ability types in reality and positive costs for each differentiated educational level,
governments can only provide a limited number of specific educational levels and cannot reach
the first best educational levels by matching all ability types. The restriction to one educational
level is thus only a simplification which does not alter the main insights of our results.
There is some literature about the effects of student’s mobility on the provision of higher
education. A branch focuses on tax-financed systems and the free-rider problem, which depends
critically on the degree of graduates return migration. Del Rey (2001) assumes that all for-
eign students return home after accomplishing education and pay taxes only in their countries
of origin. Mechtenberg and Strausz (2008) consider foreign students who acquire productive
mulitcultural skills and stay in their host country with an exogenous probability. In both pa-
pers, governments underinvest in public education as long as some of their native students come
back, due to the free-rider problem. Justman and Thisse (2000) analyze a model with endoge-
nous labor mobility. Graduates take into account regional wage differentials among other factors
when deciding in which country they prefer to work. Here the reason for underinvestment in
education is that the emigration of some graduates in equilibrium generates positive external
effects on the other region that are ignored by the local government. Lange (2008) extends the
analysis by allowing some mobility for both skilled workers and students. Depending on the
stay rate of graduates, over- or under-investment in education is possible. Our analysis sensibly
differs since pure free-riding and spill-over effects are not present. Allowing for differentiated
educational levels across countries, it is the competition for students that generates distortions
and may result in inefficient equilibria if return probabilities of foreign students are sufficiently
low.
There are two recent papers which are closest to our analysis. Kemnitz (2007) compares
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the impact of different funding reforms on teaching quality and welfare. He finds that uniform
tuition fees and student grants fail to achieve the welfare optimum because the quality choices
of universities are uniform and not differentiated according to abilities. In contrast, graduate
taxes may be introduced in a way to implement the optimum. Haupt, Krieger and Lange (2010)
analyze differentiated tax and fee-financed education policies of two countries which compete
for students from the rest of the world. Countries set two policy instruments: educational
qualities and tuition fees. They show that in equilibrium educational qualities are differentiated
in order to relax tuition-fee competition. Furthermore, they find that the country with the higher
educational level decreases this quality level with a lower return probability of foreign students.
Our paper complements this analysis. We focus on the impact of students’ mobility on the
competition via educational qualities and assume private funding. In our model the decisions of
students both whether and where to study are endogenous. Combined with return probabilities
of foreign students this allows us to analyze equilibria with differentiated educational qualities
as well as with symmetric ones. Furthermore, we find unambiguous welfare implications: In
an asymmetric equilibrium the differentiation of educational levels is inefficiently low, in a
symmetric equilibrium the educational level is too high.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model and analyzes a closed
economy as a benchmark. Section 3 considers two open economies. First the optimal allocation
is derived. Then we determine the Nash equilibria of the game in three cases: a) all foreign
students return home, b) no foreign student returns home, c) some foreign students return home.
We compare the Nash equilibria with the optimal allocation. Section 4 concludes.
2 Closed economy
2.1 The model
The analysis is conducted in a stationary overlapping generations model in which the population
is constant. The economy is kept as simple as possible. There is a single consumption good
that is produced by skilled and unskilled labor through a linear technology. The good cannot
be stored and there is no capital. In each period higher education has to be financed via tuition
fees by the students.4 Since students do not have any income they have to borrow money in
the first period in order to finance their higher education. Borrowing takes place between the
individuals of one generation (not all decide to study) and possibly between generations. Credit
markets are perfect and we are at the golden rule: the interest rate in the steady state without
frictions is equal to the population growth rate, which is here equal to zero (see Gale, 1973).
The production sector The production sector in each country uses two kinds of input: labor
supplied by individuals with and without higher education, Ls (skilled labor) and Lu (unskilled
labor), respectively. Production takes place according to a linear technology where the wage
rates of the skilled workers, ws, and the unskilled workers, wu, are assumed to be given and
constant
F (Lu, Ls) = wsLs + wuLu. (1)
Production is thus completely determined by the labor supply of skilled and unskilled workers
which in turn is given by the individuals’ decisions to acquire higher education.
4In a companion paper (Demange, Fenge and Uebelmesser, 2008), we have shown that pure fee-financing of
higher education is optimal if credit markets are perfectly competitive. Since we model higher education as a
private good without externalities this is a natural outcome.
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The demand for higher education Individuals are distinguished by an ability parameter y
which reflects individually different benefits from higher education. The distribution of abilities
is identical in each country and assumed to be uniform in the range [0, y].
To be skilled, an individual must receive some education. Quality of education or the educa-
tional level, respectively, is denoted by e. The quantity of skilled labor provided by an educated
worker with education level e depends on her ability y: it is given by ye. For simplicity, we
assume that the amount of money spent for higher education per individual, given by c(e), only
depends on the educational level. Put differently, costs of education are proportional to the
number of students for a given quality.5 The cost function c is assumed to be increasing and
strictly convex. Throughout the paper, to avoid corner solutions, we shall assume that marginal
costs of education increase indefinitely with the level: lime→∞ c′(e) =∞.
If an individual decides to study, she pays the educational costs as fees during the first
period, c(e), and earns no wage income. In the second period, the educated worker receives a
gross wage rate ws for each unit of effective labor supply so that the wage income depends on
her ability y: wsye. Thus her lifetime income is
wsye− c (e) .
If the individual decides not to study she receives a wage income wu in both periods. Hence,
her lifetime income is
2wu.
The individual compares both lifetime incomes and chooses the option which maximizes her
income. The decision whether to study or not depends on the ability of the individual. The
marginal ability type who is indifferent between both options is given by
yu =
2wu + c(e)
wse
. (2)
Individuals with a lower ability, y < yu, do not study and are employed as unskilled workers.
Individuals with a higher ability, y > yu, take up higher education in the first period and work
as skilled workers in the second period.
Employment We describe here how the educational level e determines the supply of skilled
and unskilled workers on the labor market.
As already mentioned, the population growth rate is assumed to be nil. In each period, em-
ployment consists of young and old unskilled workers and old skilled workers. Let an educational
level e and a threshold ability level of skilled workers yu be given. The number of unskilled work-
ers per generation, denoted by Nu, is equal to yu and the number of skilled workers, denoted
by Ns, is equal to y − yu. The employment of unskilled labor is given by
Lu = 2
yu∫
0
1 dy = 2yu = 2Nu (3)
5Education is thus considered here to be a private good.
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and the effective skilled labor by
Ls =
y∫
yu
yedy = e
(
y2 − (yu)2
2
)
= (y − yu) e
(
y + yu
2
)
= Nse
(
y + yu
2
)
(4)
which is equal to the number of skilled workers multiplied by their average ability and the
educational level.
2.2 Optimal allocation
Under complete information on individuals’ abilities, a social planner can determine the level
of education and the ability of those who study. The welfare criterion is aggregate production
net of education cost at a steady state, given by F (Ls, Lu) − Nsc(e). This is the criterion
that obtains in a fully fledged overlapping generations economy in which the planner treats all
generations equally. In other words, we are at the golden rule with an implicit interest rate
equal to the population growth rate, here zero (Gale, 1973).
The choice of the level of education and of the minimum ability of those who study, e and y
respectively, fully determines skilled and unskilled labor from (3) and (4). Hence defining
W (y, e) = wsLs + wuLu −Nsc(e) (5)
where from (3) and (4) Lu and Ls are functions of e and y and Ns is a function of y alone. The
objective is to maximize Max
y,e
W (y, e).
The impact of a marginal increase in e keeping the set of students fixed is given by
∂W
∂e
= ws
∂Ls
∂e
+ wu
∂Lu
∂e
−Nsc′(e)
= (y − y)
[
ws
y + y
2
− c′(e)
]
. (6)
It is equal to the effect of the quality level on the production of the skilled workers minus the
increase in costs.
The impact of a marginal increase in the minimum ability level y keeping the education level
fixed is given by
∂W
∂y
= ws
∂Ls
∂y
+ wu
∂Lu
∂y
− c (e) ∂Ns
∂y
= −wsey + 2wu + c(e). (7)
It is equal to the net impact on the productivity of a student of ability just equal to y from
becoming skilled compared to remaining unskilled where the impact is measured at the steady
state situation.
The objective function is concave in e and in y. At the optimum, assumed to be interior, the
level of education and the threshold ability level are characterized by the following first-order
conditions
ws
y + y
2
= c′(e) (8)
wsey − 2wu − c(e) = 0 (9)
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that is, the marginal gain from a change in educational quality on the average student, ws y+y2 ,
is equal to the marginal costs, and the net gain of education for the marginal student is null.
In the sequel, we put a superscript ∗ to indicate the values at the optimum solution for the
educational levels and the threshold ability. In the following, individuals’ abilities are assumed
to be unobservable (or not contractible) by governments.
2.3 Government’s decision on the educational level e
Due to informational asymmetries, the set of students cannot be chosen in the same way as an
omniscient social planner does. The government chooses the level of education taking account
of the individual decisions which are determined by the threshold level of ability. The welfare
criterion of the government is still the aggregate production net of education cost at a steady
state.
Given an educational level, the ability threshold which determines who decides to study is
denoted by yu(e) (see equation (2)). Thus, the government’s objective is
Max
e
W (yu(e), e) = wsLs + wuLu −Nsc(e) (10)
in which skilled and unskilled labor levels are those determined by the threshold ability level
Ns = y − yu(e), Lu = 2yu(e), Ls = Nse
(
y + yu(e)
2
)
(11)
The impact on welfare due to a marginal change of education is composed of two terms: an
indirect one through the selection of abilities and a direct one. Formally, the marginal change in
welfare that results from an increase in the educational level chosen by the government is given
by
dW
de
=
∂W
∂y
dyu
de
+
∂W
∂e
(12)
where dy
u
de denotes the change in the threshold ability level and thus in the selection of abilities.
The key point is that individuals’ choices are not distorted in our model under full fee financ-
ing. In other words, the optimal ability associated with a given educational level coincides with
that chosen by individuals. Specifically ∂W∂y (y
u(e), e) is identically null as can be seen from (2)
and (7). An immediate consequence is that the optimal allocation and the maximal value for
welfare can be reached even without observing abilities. By choosing the optimal level e∗, the
associated optimal set of students is selected, those with ability larger than y∗ = yu(e∗), and
surely the government cannot do better.
3 Two open economies with mobile students
We study the same model as before - now, however, with two economies where students are
mobile. We assume that unskilled workers are immobile whereas students and skilled workers
are mobile across countries.6 In particular, individuals who decide to study have no migration
costs and choose the country where they attain higher education. Graduates may stay in the
country where they have completed higher education or come back to their home country with
6This corresponds to empirical evidence according to which mobility increases with education. See, e.g.,
Ehrenberg and Smith (1993), Mauro and Spilimbergo (1999), Coniglio and Prota (2003) and Hunt (2006).
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Figure 1: Threshold levels yu and yAB for eA > eB
some return probability as described below. As a benchmark, we start by analyzing the choice
made by an omniscient social planner who can decide on the level of education in each country
and on the ability of those who study and at which level. An alternative interpretation is
that the two countries cooperate in their choice of the levels of education and have complete
information on abilities. We then study a non cooperative game played by the two countries
under various scenarii on the return rate of the graduates who have studied abroad.
3.1 Optimum
We consider the aggregate welfare over the two countries as the objective. The fact that there
is a uniform educational level in each country is a constraint. This opens up the possibility of
overall welfare gains if distinct educational levels are chosen in both countries and students are
mobile. The omniscient social planner can choose two levels of education and the ability of those
who study and at which level. Denote by eA and eB the educational levels (even though here
an educational level is not necessarily attached to a specific country). With obvious notation
overall welfare is
W = wsLs + wuLu − c(eA)NAs − c(eB)NBs (13)
in which the number of students and skilled and unskilled labor are determined by the planner.
Arguing directly, it is optimal to split individuals according to their abilities. If eA ≥ eB
for instance, let yAB be the minimum ability of those who are assigned to a high educational
level, and yu the minimum ability of those who are allowed to study. Individuals with an ability
between yu and yAB acquire the low level of education eB and those with an ability between
yAB and y acquire the high level eA, as depicted in Figure 1.
Hence the policy tools available to the planner are summarized by the levels of education levels
eA and eB , and the thresholds, yu and yAB , which describe the abilities of those who acquire a
given level. They fully determine the number of students in each program as well as skilled and
unskilled labor:
NAs = 2
(
y − yAB) , NBs = 2 (yAB − yu) (14)
Ls =
(
y − yAB) (y + yAB)eA + (yAB − yu) (yAB + yu)eB , Lu = 4yu. (15)
Plugging these expressions as function of the policy tools in the welfare criterion W in equation
(13) gives the objective to be maximized. The objective is concave, and with similar compu-
tations as in the case of a single quality level, the optimum is characterized by the following
first-order conditions
ws
y + yAB
2
− c′(eA) = 0 and ws y
AB + yu
2
− c′(eB) = 0 (16)
−wseAyAB + c(eA) = −wseByAB + c(eB) and − wseByu + c(eB) = −2wu (17)
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These conditions are easily interpreted. Conditions (16) say that the educational levels are
optimal given the thresholds, that is given the set of students. The marginal gain from a change
of the high educational level for the average student, ws y+y
AB
2 , is equal to the marginal costs,
c′(eA), and similarly for the lower level of education. Conditions (17) say that the ability of the
students in each program is optimal given the education levels proposed. The net gain of top
education relative to the lower level is null for the student with marginal ability yAB and the
net gain of the low level of education compared to remaining uneducated is null for the marginal
student yu.
Hence optimality calls for differentiation. We shall denote by (e∗, e∗) the distinct optimal
levels with e∗ > e∗.
3.2 Game in educational levels
This section considers the situation with informational asymmetries and full mobility for stu-
dents. As in a closed economy, a government chooses the level of education in its country taking
account of the individual decisions. In an open economy, individuals face more choices and their
decisions are affected by the education levels chosen by both countries. Mobility thus gener-
ates a game between the two countries. Before spelling out governments’ criteria, we analyze
individuals’ decisions.
3.2.1 Individual choices
We consider the free choice of individuals when the two countries have chosen their education
levels, eA and eB .
A young individual born in country I, I = A,B now not only has to decide whether to study
but also where to study. Since wages are constant, the lifetime income of a young who decides
to study in I is yeIws − c
(
eI
)
. This implies that the maximum lifetime income of a y-young
individual who decides to become skilled is
Vs(y) = max[yeAws − c
(
eA
)
, yeBws − c
(
eB
)
]
Similarly, the lifetime income of an unskilled worker is unchanged, given by 2wu in both coun-
tries. The individual chooses to be skilled if Vs(y) ≥ 2wu.
In the symmetric case where educational levels are equal, eA = eB = e, individuals are
indifferent between studying in either country. In that case we shall assume that they split
equally (as occurs, for example, if they do not move at all).
Assume now that education levels are distinct. We take eA > eB . The return to education
increases with ability. As a result, the individuals who choose to study in A and not in B are
those with high enough ability and the individuals who stay unskilled are those with low enough
ability. Specifically, let yAB be the type of an individual who is indifferent between studying in
A and B. It is the value defined by
yABeBws − c
(
eB
)
= yABeAws − c
(
eA
)
. (18)
or
yAB =
c
(
eA
)− c (eB)
ws(eA − eB)
Analogously, let yu be the type of an individual who is indifferent between studying and not
studying. It is defined by
yueBws − c
(
eB
)
= 2wu. (19)
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Assuming yu < yAB < y, young individuals partition themselves according to their abilities as
depicted in Figure 1.
Comparing the conditions (18) and (19) with the optimality condition for the thresholds
(17) given education levels (eA, eB), we see that there is no distortion. As in the case with a
single level, the private benefit and the social benefit of taking up a given educational level or
of remaining unskilled coincide. This yields the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 The optimal partition of ability types of students between countries associated with
given education levels coincides with that chosen by individuals.
An immediate consequence is that the optimum can be obtained even without observing
ability levels: If the optimal levels of education are implemented, it suffices to let individuals
choose whether (and where) to study. These optimal levels can be thought as resulting from the
decisions of a union of countries acting in a cooperative way. Thus any inefficiency that may
result from a non-cooperative choice in educational levels is not due to individuals choices.
3.2.2 Return rate and Welfare criterion
The game between the governments is determined by the criterion on which governments base
their choices. With migration, population is variable within a country, and a variety of welfare
criteria may be considered (see e.g. the discussion in Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson, 2006).
We consider a residents’ welfare criterion according to which the government is concerned with
the residential workers (natives or foreigners). This criterion is affected by a ’graduate return
probability’. As shown below, a native welfare criterion according to which the government only
cares about its natives wherever they work coincides with the residential welfare criterion when
all foreign graduates come back.
Skilled workers are indifferent between working in either country, so that any migration
decision they may take is rational. Their behavior is described as follows. Students who have
studied abroad come back to work in their home country with probability pi, called the return
rate. Those who study in their home country do not move afterwards and remain as skilled
workers in their home country. The return rate pi is independent of everything else, and in
particular of the ability type. The return rate determines the skilled labor force in each country
as follows.
To fix the idea, let us eA > eB . The top ability students from both countries study in
country A. Their number is 2
(
y − yAB) as given by (14). Half of the students in A come from
country B, and among those a proportion pi ∈ [0, 1] comes back to the home country B as
skilled workers. Hence only the fraction 1−pi/2 of skilled workers with education level eA works
in A and the remaining fraction, pi/2, works in B. Similarly, the low ability students of both
countries study in country B. Their total number is 2
(
yAB − yu), and among those a fraction
pi/2 will work in country A and the fraction 1− pi/2 in country B.
The residential welfare of a country is defined as the aggregate lifetime income of the res-
idents. Since the cost of education is entirely borne by a student, the lifetime income of a
skilled worker is defined as his wage income diminished by the cost of its education level. There
are three types of workers: the skilled workers with education levels eA or eB and the unskilled
workers. The lifetime income of all unskilled workers in a country is 2wuyu. To simplify notation
let Y A denote the lifetime income of all skilled workers with education level eA, and similarly
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for Y B . We have
WA(eA, eB) = (1− pi
2
)Y A +
pi
2
Y B + 2wuyu, (20)
WB(eA, eB) =
pi
2
Y A +
(
1− pi
2
)
Y B + 2wuyu. (21)
The interpretation is simple : country A keeps 1 − pi/2 of the students who were educated in
the country and pi/2 of those who studied in B, and similarly for B.
It remains to spell out the values for Y A and Y B . Take eA > eB (the case eA < eB is
symmetric). The average effective labour supply of a skilled worker with education level eA is
y+yAB
2 e
A, which yields an average lifetime income equal to ws y+y
AB
2 e
A − c(eA). Similarly the
average effective labour supply of a skilled worker with education level eB is y
AB+yu
2 e
B , which
yields an average lifetime income equal to ws y
AB+yu
2 e
B − c(eB). Weighting by the number of
students in A, 2
(
y − yAB), or in B, 2 (yAB − yu), we obtain for eA > eB
Y A = 2
(
y − yAB) [ws y + yAB2 eA − c (eA)
]
(22)
Y B = 2
(
yAB − yu) [ws yAB + yu2 eB − c(eB)
]
. (23)
In the following we analyze scenarii with differing return probability rates of students. For
this, it is useful to note that total welfare is independent on that rate. Thus the return rate
matters only because it determines the share of this total welfare assigned to a country. Specif-
ically, let TW (eA, eB) denote the total welfare associated to two education levels, eA, eB . We
have
TW (eA, eB) = Y A + Y B + 4wuyu (24)
and the identity
TW (eA, eB) =WA(eA, eB) +WB(eA, eB). (25)
Since the return rate determines the share of the total welfare assigned to a country, it affects
a country’s incentive to choose an education level. In particular, the larger the return rate is,
the less the skilled labor force in a country depends on the country’s decision. At one extreme,
where the return rate is null (pi = 0), each country ends up with the skilled labor force that
graduated in the country. This opens up the possibility of competition for students. At the
other extreme case where the return rate is one (pi = 1), each country ends up with the same
labor force. In the intermediate case, with pi between 0 and 1, it turns out that the welfare of
each country is a combination of the welfare obtained in each extreme case. From (20) we can
write
WA(eA, eB) = (1− pi)[Y A + 2wuyu] + pi[ 12(Y
A + Y B) + 2wuyu].
The first term in square brackets is the welfare of A for pi equal to zero, and the second term
the welfare of A for pi equal to one. Thus WA can be written as (1− pi)WA|pi=0 + piWA|pi=1 where
WA|pi=0 and W
A
|pi=1 are the welfare levels in the two extreme cases pi = 0 and pi = 1 respectively.
This is also true for B, so we obtain:
W I(eA, eB) = (1− pi)W I|pi=0 + piW I|pi=1(eA, eB) I = A,B. (26)
11
We will analyze first in detail the two extreme cases where all students who take up higher
education in a foreign country either return after graduation to their home (pi = 1) or stay in the
foreign country (pi = 0). We are especially interested in whether countries want to match their
levels of education leading to a symmetric equilibrium or whether they aim at differentiating
their levels, and what impact this has on total welfare. In that purpose, it is useful to determine
students’ behavior for almost identical educational levels in both countries, and to understand
the benefits to differentiation.
Scope for differentiation Marginal changes in education levels in a neighborhood of a sym-
metric situation have a dramatic selection effect on the students. Starting from identical levels
(e, e), if a country say A increases slightly its educational level above e, the set of students split
into two parts with A attracting the top ability students, and B attracting the low ability ones.
Thus, a massive reallocation of students takes place. To make this precise, consider the type
of an individual who is indifferent between studying in A and B, yAB , as eA and eB are very
close. Making the education levels converge to e, the limits of yAB from above or below e are
given by:
lim
eA→e+
c
(
eA
)− c (e)
ws(eA − e) = limeB→e−
c (e)− c (eB)
ws(e− eB) =
c′(e)
ws
.
We denote this limit by ylim(e):
ylim(e) =
c′(e)
ws
. (27)
Starting from identical levels, countries share equally the students, the individuals with ability
above yu. By marginal increasing its level eA above e, country A attracts all top ability students,
those with ability larger than ylim(e), and B attracts those with ability between yu and ylim(e).
If a country say B decreases its level below e, the analysis is similar but there is also a marginal
change in the unskilled level yu since it is determined by the smallest level eB (as given by (19)).
Such an analysis is true provided e is not too extreme. Specifically the thresholds given by
(18) and (19) are valid if y > yAB > yu. These inequalities are satisfied for education levels
close to e if
y >
c′(e)
ws
>
2wu + c(e)
wse
. (28)
When inequalities (28) hold we say that there is scope for differentiation at e. In that case it
turns out that not only differentiation is possible but it is beneficial, as stated in the following
lemma.
Lemma 2 Total welfare TW is continuous in educational levels. It is maximum at (e∗, e∗).
Furthermore, assume that there is scope for differentiation at e, i.e. that (28) holds. Then
lim
eA→e+
∂TW
∂eA
(eA, e) = ws
(
y − c
′(e)
ws
)2
, lim
eB→e−
∂TW
∂eB
(e, eB) = −ws
(
c′(e)
ws
− yu
)2
(29)
where yu = 2wu + c(e)wse . As a result there are strong benefits to differentiation.
Proof. See the proof section.
The fact that the optimum can be obtained even without observing ability levels explains
why the maximum of TW is obtained at (e∗, e∗). We emphasize the continuity property of total
welfare even at symmetric levels (e, e): even though the students reallocate between the two
12
countries, each individual lifetime income is continuous in the education levels, hence the total
welfare as well. Instead, when we consider countries’ welfare the reallocation of students will
generate discontinuities in their levels, and the jumps will be in the opposite direction (since the
sum of the countries’ welfare, TW , is continuous). According to (29), ∂TW
∂eA
(eA, e) is positive
for eA sufficiently close to e but larger than e: increasing slightly the education level eA above
e a symmetric situation typically increases welfare. Similarly, since ∂TW
∂eB
(e, eB) is negative for
eB sufficiently close to e but smaller than e, decreasing slightly the education level of B below
e increases welfare (of course similar results obtain by exchanging the roles of A and B, i.e. if
eA is decreased or eB is increased). Hence, there is a benefit to differentiation, whatever the
direction, as long as differentiation is possible.
3.3 Graduates return to their home country (pi = 1) or the native
welfare criterion
When all students come back to work home, each country ends up with an identical number of
skilled and unskilled labor. Countries’ welfare are therefore identical, each one equal to half the
total welfare TW :
WA|pi=1
(
eA, eB
)
= WB|pi=1
(
eA, eB
)
=
1
2
TW
(
eA, eB
)
(30)
=
(
y − yAB)(ws y + yAB2 eA − c (eA)
)
+
(
yAB − yu)(ws yAB + yu2 eB − c (eB)
)
+ 2wuyu.
Such a criterion is also obtained under the ’native’s principle’ according to which a govern-
ment is concerned with the well-being of the natives even those who have left the country, and
does not care about the immigrants. Hence, the results obtained in this section apply if both
governments act according to the native’s principle.
How total welfare reacts to a change in an educational level gives insight on the incentive for
a country to differentiate its education level when the graduate return probability is one (since
a country’s welfare is given by half the total welfare). Taking the point of view of country A
when B’s educational level is fixed at e, we have that eA → TW (eA, e) has a local minimum at
eA = e with a kink. To see this, Lemma 2 gives, exchanging the role of A and B in the second
inequality of (29):
lim
eA→>e
∂TW
∂eA
(eA, e) = ws
(
y − c
′(e)
ws
)2
, lim
eA→<e
∂TW
∂eA
(eA, e) = −ws
(
c′(e)
ws
− yu
)2
< 0.
Hence, a country benefits by decreasing its level below that of the other country and also by
increasing it. There is a strong force towards differentiation, and a symmetric situation is surely
not an equilibrium. Actually, countries choose the optimal differentiation levels at equilibrium,
as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If all graduates return to their home country (or if countries maximize the
welfare of their natives), optimal differentiated educational levels, (e∗, e∗) or (e∗, e∗), form a
Nash equilibrium. There is no other Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof that optimal differentiation is a Nash equilibrium is straightforward.
By recognizing that in each country welfare is just half of total welfare it is obvious that the
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incentives of both countries and the social planner are aligned. As a result, if one country
chooses one of the optimal levels, say the largest one e∗, the other country optimal choice is the
lowest e∗, (and vice versa). For the proof of uniqueness see the proof section.
The intuition for this result is that with a return probability of one both countries have
the same labor force wherever the workers have been educated, and are concerned by efficiency
considerations only, as illustrated below.
We can summarize. When all foreign students return to their home country, which is equiva-
lent to countries taking account of their natives only, there are strong forces to differentiate the
educational quality. Either countries decide to provide high quality at high cost and educate
the high ability students or they decide to keep cost low with lower educational quality and to
educate the low ability students. Whatever the decision may be the result in terms of welfare
is the same for the country because the students return home and both countries share the
same labor force with the same ability composition. The resulting equilibrium differentiated
educational levels are unique and optimal.
3.3.1 Illustration
This section illustrates the response functions for pi = 1 in the case of the following specifications.
The cost function is quadratic: c (e) = (e)2, y = 10; ws = 2 and wu = 1. For eA ∈ [0; 10] and
eB ∈ [0; 10] the restriction holds that y ≥ yAB . Figure 2 displays the response function and the
Nash equilibrium.
Response functions are first increasing in the educational level of the other country. The
reason is the following. Starting with a low educational level in, let us say, country B all the
upper ability types of students in the range
[
yAB , y
]
study in country A. For increasing values
of the educational level in country B, the threshold ability yAB goes up. This implies that
the average ability level of the more able students in country A rises. Maximizing their lifetime
income country A increases in response also its educational level. The point is that both countries
in setting their educational levels are only concerned with maximizing the lifetime income of
their ability types of students. Since we know that students choose the country in an optimal
way whatever the educational levels, countries have no incentive to attract students by setting
their educational levels. Thus efficiency remains the only aim to be achieved by determining
educational levels.
At some point where the educational level of country B is high enough - in Figure 2 the
jump downwards of the response function of country A - the welfare gain of educating high
ability students becomes smaller than the welfare gain of education low ability students. Now
country A chooses to be the country educating low ability types and the roles of both countries
are interchanged.
In the Nash equilibria where response functions intersect the optimal differentiation of the
educational levels is achieved. In our example, the levels of the high and the low optimal
education in the Nash equilibrium are given by:
e∗ = 8.1, e∗ = 4.3
The analysis changes when foreign students do not all return home because countries get an
incentive to compete for students, as we examine now. This may result in a differentiation of
educational qualities less than optimal, or even in no differentiation at all.
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Figure 2: Response function in the case pi = 1.
3.4 Graduates stay where they were educated (pi = 0)
This section considers the other extreme scenario in which all students who study abroad stay
there after graduation.
With distinct education levels eA > eB , income Y A and Y B are given by (22) and (23).
Taking pi equal to 0 in welfare criteria (20) and (21) yields :
WA|pi=0 = ws
(
y − yAB) (y + yAB)eA + 2yuwu − 2c(eA) (y − yAB) (31)
WB|pi=0 = ws
(
yAB − yu) (yAB + yu)eB + 2yuwu − 2c(eB)(yAB − yu), (32)
and in the symmetric case where both countries choose the same level e, welfare in each country
amounts to
WA|pi=0 =W
B
|pi=0 = ws (y − yu) (y + yu)e/2 + 2yuwu − c(e)(y − yu). (33)
Now the competition for students, who become skilled workers in the country of education,
plays an important role in the choices of the education levels. This competition is especially
harsh when the educational levels of the two countries approach one another. The massive
reallocation of students around symmetric educational levels generates discontinuities in the
welfare levels of the countries and incentives to differentiation. This is not true however at a
level denoted by eˆ, which will play an important role.
To illustrate this, we first analyze the situation where countries choose the optimal educa-
tional level of a closed economy and then open up their borders for mobile students. We then
analyze Nash-equilibria.
Incentives to differentiation Let each country choose the single-constrained optimal level
e∗ of a closed economy given by (8). We show that a marginal increase is profitable to a country.
The following reasoning is illustrated in Figure 3. At the optimum e∗ the marginal gain from a
change in the educational level on the average student, ws y+y
∗
2 , is equal to the marginal cost,
c′(e∗). This implies that e∗ is ’too high’ for the marginal student with ability y∗ and ’too low’
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Figure 3: The sorting of ability types to countries with a single-constrained educational level.
for the top ability student.7 It follows that if country A increases slightly its educational level,
the set of students split into two parts with A attracting the top ability students. The set of
individuals who decide to study is unchanged, yu = y∗.
To assess the possible benefits for A, consider the type of an individual who is indifferent
between studying in A and B, yAB , satisfying yABeAws − c
(
eA
)
= yABe∗ws − c (e∗). Observe
that by convexity of c (e) we have that
yAB =
c
(
eA
)− c (e∗)
ws(eA − e∗) ≥
c′(e∗)
ws
=
y + y∗
2
.
where the last equation follows from the optimality conditions (see also Figure 3). Hence,
country A, by providing a higher educational level than B not only attracts the best students
but also deters half of the bottom students at least. This is true whatever the level eA strictly
larger than e∗. Taking the limit of yAB when eA tends to e∗ gives
ylim(e∗) =
c′(e∗)
ws
=
y + y∗
2
. (34)
Thus if A increases slightly its educational level, the overall set of individuals who decide to
study is unchanged, given by the individuals whose ability is larger than y∗. Individuals with
ability larger than the average over the students, those with ability in (y+y
∗
2 , y) study in A, and
individuals with ability lower than the average, those with ability in (y∗, y+y
∗
2 ), study in B. In
words, for eA arbitrarily close but larger than e∗, A has the same number of students as at the
initial situation, but the ability composition has increased. This results in an improvement of
welfare in country A. Simple computation gives that welfare is increased by
ws
(
y − y∗
2
)2
e∗.
7Specifically, consider the lifetime income of a young individual with ability y, yews − c (e), as a function of
e. It is concave in e with a derivative given by yws − c′ (e). For y = y∗ this derivative is negative at e = e∗,
y∗ws − c′ (e∗) < 0, since c′(e∗) is equal to ws y+y
∗
2
. Thus the lifetime income y∗ews − c (e) decreases with
e at e = e∗: a student with ability y∗ prefers a (slightly) lower educational level than e∗. At the opposite,
yws − c′ (e∗) > 0, and a similar argument gives that students with large enough ability strictly prefer a larger
educational level than e∗.
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More generally, there is a discontinuity when the education levels become equalized. The reason
comes from the students’ mobility which results in a change in the skilled labor force. Thus the
forces towards differentiation are strong. We now study how this affects equilibrium.
Nash-equilibrium By the same computation as in (34), a country that increases marginally
its level attracts all students with ability larger than the value ylim = c′(e)/ws. Similarly, a
country that decreases marginally its level attracts all students with ability lower than this
value. There are overall the same number of students as at the symmetric situation (yu changes
marginally and only if a country decreases its level) but the ability composition of those who
study in A or in B is affected. When the net benefit from educating high ability students, those
with ability larger than ylim is strictly larger than the net benefit from educating low ability
students, those with ability between ylim and yu, increasing marginally the educational level
above that of the other country so as to attract the high ability students is surely beneficial.
This was shown to be the case at the optimal single level e∗. Similarly, when the net benefit
from educating low ability students is larger than that from educating high ability students, a
country surely benefits from choosing its education level slightly below that of the other country.
There is a (unique) level, denoted by eˆ, for which these benefits are equalized. Such a level is
larger than e∗ and is the only possible candidate for a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies.
We make this precise.
Next lemma analyzes the the welfare of a country as it educational level is close to the other
country’s level. Consider A for example. Keeping the education level eB fixed at e, start with
a lower level in country A and increase it. When eA reaches e, A and B share the students
equally, and by symmetry A’s welfare WA|pi=0(e, e) equals half the total welfare
1
2TW (e, e). This
may generate a jump in country A′s welfare, measured by 12TW (e, e)− limeA→e− WA|pi=0(eA, e).
When eA becomes larger than e, the roles of A and B are exchanged with A now attracting the
high ability students. Hence, there may be another jump. According to the next lemma, these
two jumps are equal, in particular they are of the same sign.
Lemma 3 The jumps in A welfare when eA approaches e from below or from above are equal:
lim
eA→e+
WA|pi=0(e
A, e)− 1
2
TW (e, e) =
1
2
TW (e, e)− lim
eA→e−
WA|pi=0(e
A, e) (35)
At a symmetric equilibrium, the jumps must be null.
Proof. See proof section.
The term on the left hand side measures the jump in A’s welfare as A increases its level up
to B’s level and the term on the right hand side is the jump in A’s welfare as A improves upon
B’s level.
The intuition behind the lemma is the following one. The sum of the two countries welfare
depends on the levels eA and eB in a continuous way, which implies that around symmetric levels
(e, e), countries are playing approximately a constant two-person game. The ability composition
of those who study in A or in B, however, depends on which level is larger and affects the share
of the total welfare received by each country. The jump in A welfare when eA is decreased from
above towards e is exactly compensated by the jump in B welfare. Exchanging the role of A
and B gives the result.
Let eˆ be a value for which the jumps are null. At this level, the net benefit from educating
high ability students, those with ability larger than yAB , is exactly equal to the net benefit from
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Figure 4: Welfare of country A at eB = e = 4.3 and pi = 0.
educating low ability students, those with ability between yAB and yu. By definition the value
of WA|pi=0(e
A, eˆ) is close to TW (eˆ, eˆ) for eA close to eˆ, and the same for B by symmetry.
Under some conditions on the cost function, level eˆ gives rise to an equilibrium, which is
furthermore the unique equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Assume that all graduates stay where they were educated (pi = 0). If countries
start with the optimal educational level in a closed economy and open up their borders, students’
mobility induces countries to increase the educational level above this optimal level.
With a quadratic cost function, an equilibrium in pure strategies is symmetric. Countries choose
both the same educational level eˆ, larger than e∗.
Proof. See the proof section.
Thus in the case where an equilibrium is necessarily symmetric, as for a quadratic cost
function, the outcome is worse than in the closed economy case. When no differentiation occurs
at equilibrium, opening the borders and introducing competition for students can only impair
welfare if the starting situation was the optimal one in a closed economy. Competition for
students ends up with a too high quality of education and too few students.
3.4.1 Illustration
This section illustrates the competition for students and the induced discontinuities of the welfare
functions as established above. We use again our example of a quadratic cost function with the
specification of parameters as in section 3.3.1. In Figure 4 the welfare of country A is represented
for the fixed value of eB = e∗.
The welfare function is piecewise defined with a cutoff point when A chooses the same level
as B. It is concave in each domain but because of the discontinuity when eA = eB , welfare is
not overall concave in eA. There is a jump when eA reaches eB because A and B now share
the students equally. The other jump, which is in the same direction equal to the first one by
Lemma 3, occurs when eA becomes larger than eB . The roles of A and B are exchanged with
A now attracting the high ability students.
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Figure 5: Welfare of country A at eB = eˆ = 8.285 and pi = 0.
Which educational level country A will choose depends on a comparison of the maximum
welfare levels on each part, eA strictly less, equal to or strictly larger than eB = e∗ = 4.3. In
the first part, for eA < e∗, welfare increases linear with eA and the maximum is achieved by
approaching the educational level e∗ from below. The maximal welfare is lim
eA→e∗
WA
(
eA < e∗
) ≈
44.05. In the second part, country A chooses the same level as country B, eA = e∗, welfare is
269.5 from (33). In the third part, eA > e∗, the welfare function is strictly concave and has a
maximum value WA
(
eA > e∗
)
= 537.8 reached at eA = 6.2. Hence, country A maximizes its
welfare by choosing an educational level which is higher than the optimal level in country B,
eA = 6.2 > e∗.
Figure 5 illustrates that the welfare function of country A becomes continuous at the sym-
metric equilibrium eA = eB = eˆ. Calculation yield the optimal single level, e∗, and the value eˆ
as:
e∗ = 6.765, eˆ = 8.285
As expected, the educational level at the symmetric equilibrium, eˆ, is larger than the optimal
level in a closed economy, e∗.
The best response functions of both countries are depicted in Figure 6.
The intuition for the shape of the response function of country A (and vice versa for country
B) is the following. Starting with a low educational level in country B an increase of this level
attracts high ability students from country A. As a response country A decreases its educational
level in order to regain the students lost. The essential point in the case of pi = 0 is that the
students do not come back once they have decided to study in a foreign country. Thus countries
compete for the students in the first place by setting their educational levels appropriately. If
country A’s educational level gets close to the level of country B the number of students in
both countries is nearly the same as with a symmetric provision of levels but the composition of
abilities depends on which level is higher. Country A starts to keep its educational level slightly
higher than country B in order to keep the high ability students. Hence the response function
increases with the level in the other country. At some point the welfare gain of educating
high ability students in A is equal to the welfare gain of educating the low ability types. This
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Figure 6: Response functions in the case of pi = 0.
point where both educational levels are symmetric - marked by a circle - is the only one where
the welfare functions in both countries are well defined and therefore the only candidate for a
Nash equilibrium. If country B increases its educational level further country A benefits from
educating the lower ability students by keeping its educational level slightly below the level of
country B.
Now we analyze the case of a partial return migration of foreign students.
3.5 Graduates only partially return to their home country (pi < 1)
In the intermediate case, we have seen that the welfare of each country is a combination of the
welfare obtained in each extreme case, as given by (26):
W I(eA, eB) = (1− pi)W I|pi=0 + piW I|pi=1(eA, eB) I = A,B. (36)
Hence, the analysis of the two extreme cases will be helpful.
If some foreign students stay in the country after graduation the competition for students
is beneficial. First we show that this competition induces a force towards less differentiation
than is optimal. In particular, the optimal differentiation levels e∗, e∗ do not form a Nash equi-
librium. Hence, a return probability falling below unity implies that the differentiation shrinks
inefficiently. Second, if the return probability of foreign students is small enough symmetric
educational levels are a Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies.
Asymmetric Nash equilibrium and optimal differentiation Consider the optimal dis-
tinct levels, with for instance A choosing the highest level: eA = e∗ and eB = e∗. Let country A
contemplate changing its educational level. From section 3.3 we know that for pi = 1 the opti-
mally differentiated educational levels are chosen in the Nash-equilibrium. Hence, the marginal
change of welfare for pi = 1 by changing eA is zero at the point of optimal differentiation. From
the representation of welfare as convex combination of the two extreme cases in (36) we can
now infer that the change in welfare at the point of optimal differentiation only depends on the
change of welfare for pi = 0.
The forces towards more convergence or more differentiation can be analyzed more generally
by considering marginal changes starting at unequal levels, say eA > eB (assuming that each
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country educates some students, i.e. 0 < yu < yAB < y). As long as we consider variations in
educational levels that are small enough so that the educational level in A is still higher than in
B, A continues to attract the students with the highest ability. Hence, a marginal change in eA
or in eB modifies the allocation of the students at the margin only through the modifications of
the thresholds yAB and yu. From the convexity of c, increasing eA or increasing eB increases
the threshold value yAB , meaning here that the number of students in B increases. As for yu,
it is independent of eA.
A marginal change in eA yields the marginal change in WA|pi=0
∂WA|pi=0
∂eA
(eA, eB) = 2
(
y − yAB) [ws y + yAB2 − c′(eA)
]
+ 2[yABeAws − c
(
eA
)
](−∂y
AB
∂eA
). (37)
The marginal change is composed of two terms. The first term reflects the efficiency gains
(possibly negative) on the current population of students in A that result from changing the
educational level. The second term reflects the migration effect that results from changes in that
population through the modification of the threshold. It is equal to the change in the number
of students, −2∂yAB
∂eA
, multiplied by the lifetime income per such student, [yABeAws − c
(
eA
)
].
Observe that this lifetime income is surely positive, hence the second term in (37) is always
negative. As a result, country A prefers a lower educational level than the one that would
maximize the efficiency gains (given the level eB) so as to attract more students. This readily
explains why the optimal educational values do not form an equilibrium: given that B chooses
e∗, country A prefers a lower educational level than the optimal one e∗.
Similarly, a marginal change in the lower educational level eB yields the marginal change in
WB
∂WB|pi=0
∂eB
(eA, eB) = 2
(
yAB − yu) [ws yAB + yu2 − c′(eB)
]
+ 2[yABeBws − c
(
eB
)
]
∂yAB
∂eB
+2[yueBws − wu − c
(
eB
)
](− ∂y
u
∂eB
). (38)
The marginal change in welfare is composed of three terms : the efficiency gains on the students
in B (the first term), a migration effect due to students moving from B to A (the second term),
and a change in the incentives to become skilled (the third term).
The efficiency gains and the migration effects are interpreted similarly as for A. Observe
that the migration effect is exactly the opposite of the one for A : the impact of the change in
the population of the students between A or B results in a simple transfer of welfare between
the two countries at the margin. The reason is that the attracted students who move from a
country to another one have roughly the same lifetime income in both countries. This can be
checked by noticing that yABeBws − c
(
eB
)
= yABeAws − c
(
eA
)
(by the arbitrage condition
(18) for the marginal student yAB) and ∂y
AB
∂eA
= ∂y
AB
∂eB
. Thus, the second term is always positive
and provides an incentive to increase the educational level above the efficient one (given eA).
A change in the lowest educational level has an additional impact on the incentives to become
skilled, as reflected by the third term in (38). Observe that a marginal change in eB has a null
overall marginal impact on the welfare of the marginal students by the arbitrage condition for
students with ability yu. This is however not the case for B because this arbitrage condition
(19) yields
[
yueBws − wu − c
(
eB
)]
= wu. Hence the third term is not null. The reason is
that unskilled individuals are immobile. Hence an increase in the number of students has a
positive impact on B due to the migration from unskilled citizens of A who become students
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in B. The welfare benefit to B is equal to the lifetime gain of these marginal students, 2wu,
multiplied by the marginal increase of students (coming from A), − ∂yu
∂eB
. This explains the third
term. Thus, country B has an additional incentive to increase its educational level when this
increases the incentive to study (i.e., when − ∂yu
∂eB
> 0). In that case, increasing the education
level above the efficient one allows B to attract students both at the bottom and at the top
of its students’ population. When instead ∂y
u
∂eB
> 0, the third term is negative and diminishes
the force to convergence. How the value yu changes is ambiguous. In the proof of the following
Proposition 3 we derive a condition under which the country with the lower educational level
has an incentive to increase its level above the optimal one.
To sum up, competition on the marginal students who are close to being indifferent between
the two countries is a force towards less differentiation. However, attracting additional workers
by inciting them to become skilled may be a countervailing effect on a country which chooses a
low educational level.
We can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Assume that pi < 1. Optimally differentiated educational levels do not constitute
an equilibrium. Supposing for example (eA, eB) = (e∗, e∗), country A has an incentive to choose
an educational level less than e∗. Furthermore, if the optimal differentiation is not too large,
i.e. e∗ > e
∗
2 , then country B has an incentive to choose an educational level higher than e
∗.
Proof. See proof section.
The intuition for this result is that a country takes into account the impact of its educational
level on foreign students who only partially return to their home country. Since the attracted
students are indifferent between the two educational levels, there is no welfare loss on the
aggregate. Those foreign students who stay in the country where they have been educated have
at the margin the same lifetime income which results in a transfer of welfare from their home
country to the country of education. The country with the higher educational level has an
incentive to decrease this level in order to attract higher ability types of students in country B.
The country with the lower educational level has an incentive to increase this level so that the
threshold ability level and the number of students increase.
The welfare implications can be explained by externalities due to students’ mobility. If
country A with the higher educational level increases its educational level the lower ability
range of its students moves to country B. This creates a positive externality on country B
because it increases the number of students and improves the ability composition of students
in country B. As a result country A chooses an educational level which is lower than optimal.
If country B with the lower educational level increases this level it attracts the lower range
of ability types of country A. This imposes a negative externality on country A which loses
students. Hence, country B chooses a higher educational level than the optimal one.
As the forces toward competition depend on pi equilibrium choices do as well. We can
safely conjecture that, under the conditions stated in Proposition 3, there is an equilibrium with
differentiated educational levels for pi close enough to 1, and that furthermore differentiation is
lower than the efficient one in the sense that e∗ < eB < eA < e∗, assuming that A provides the
larger level.
Symmetric Nash equilibrium Now we turn to the analysis of symmetric educational levels.
Recall that a country’s welfare, say A′s welfare, keeping the other country’s level fixed at eB , is
continuous for pi = 1. Instead, for pi = 0, the welfare is discontinuous when the education levels
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become equalized as stated in Lemma 3 except if eB is set equal to eˆ. Hence, the welfare in the
intermediate case 0 < pi < 1 is also discontinuous and Lemma 3 is valid for any pi smaller than
1. The following proposition shows that the stronger the competition for students (the smaller
pi), the stronger the forces to the equalization of the education levels.
Proposition 4 Whatever the value of pi, pi < 1, (eˆ, eˆ) is the unique candidate for a symmetric
equilibrium,
It is not an equilibrium when the return probability is too large, close to 1.
If (eˆ, eˆ) is an equilibrium for pi, then it is also an equilibrium when graduates return probability
is lower, that is for any value smaller than pi.
Proof. See proof section.
Summing up these results show that, for return probabilities close to unity, any Nash equi-
librium is asymmetric and the degree of differentiation is smaller than would be optimal. The
reason are externalities of students’ mobility. However, for low return probabilities a Nash
equilibrium may be symmetric and the educational level in both countries is smaller than the
optimal level in closed economies. In this case countries forgo the possible gain in welfare due
to differentiation because the low return migration of students prompts countries to compete
for students by equalizing their educational levels.
3.5.1 Illustration
Figure 4 from section 3.4.1 which represents the welfare function of A for eB = e∗ and pi = 0
shows that even in a case where the choice of the educational level is restricted to e∗ for country
B, the level chosen by country A falls short of the optimally differentiated level, eˆA < e∗.
Furthermore, we illustrate for eB = eˆ = 8.285 that the welfare function of country A is
continuous independently of all return probabilities in the range of 0 ≤ pi < 1. The welfare
functions of country A for various return probabilities is shown in Figure 7.
Only in the first two cases of pi = 0 and pi = 2/3, eˆ yields a symmetric equilibrim. As
expected, the return probability pi must be small enough to guarantee the existence of the
symmetric equilibrium.
4 Conclusion
We have examined competition in fee-financed quality levels of higher education. The mobility of
students affects educational quality in countries in a very different way depending on the degree
of return migration. In the extreme case in which all foreign students return to their home
country educational levels are differentiated optimally. Hence, opening up borders for mobile
students results in a clear-cut overall welfare gain since the various ability types of students are
matched more appropriately by differing education levels than in a closed economy with just one
educational level for all ability types. However, in the more relevant case in which some foreign
students stay in the country where they have been educated the differentiation of educational
levels is less than optimal. The reason is that both countries compete to attract foreign students.
In particular, at the optimal differentiation levels, the country with the largest education level
has an incentive to lower its education level to attract the best students of the other country,
which is harmful for its own students. Similarly under some condition the country with the
lowest education level has an incentive to raise its education level above the optimal one which
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Figure 7: Welfare of country A at eB = eˆ = 8.285 and pi = 0, 2/3, 0.9.
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reduces also the lifetime income of its home students. Furthermore, if the probability of return
migration is sufficiently low, countries do not differentiate quality at all and the symmetric
educational level is inefficiently high.
Our analysis confirms an important insight of Justman and Thisse (2000). They showed
that their underinvestment result critically depends on the government’s objective of residential
welfare. If in contrast governments take into account the welfare of native-born highly educated
this may lead to overinvestment. In our model government’s concern exclusively about natives
whereever they work results in the optimal differentiation in educational levels whereas a stronger
emphasis on foreign-born highly educated who work in the country leads to suboptimal differ-
entiaiton. Hence, statements about efficiency outcomes of higher education systems as a result
of increasing human capital mobility depend strongly on the imputed goals of governments.
What can be said about the return migration of foreign students? The extent of return
migration varies considerably between countries and depends on several factors, among others
the family status, immigration policy and the comparative employment opportunities in the
origin and destination countries (Lu et al., 2009; Tremblay, 2002, 2005). There are some em-
pirical studies showing that the fraction of foreign students who stay in their host countries
of higher education upon graduation is substantial. The stay rates of foreign students in the
United States are estimated to lie between 20 percent and 30 percent, (Rosenzweig, 2006, Low-
ell, Bump and Martin, 2007).up to about 65 percent for those who earned a doctorate in the
United States (Finn, 2003; Lowell, Bump and Martin, 2007). Foreign students who participated
in a special scholarship program in Germany have been estimated to stay in the country at a
rate of 35 percent (Hein and Plesch, 2008). Those return rates are partially a result of political
intervention. Lowell et al. (2007) report that e.g. the visa application process is a strong policy
tool to attract and to keep foreign students. Hence, there seems to be scope for competition
for students and many OECD countries are aware of this option (Chaloff and Lemaitre, 2009).
A policy implication of our analysis is this that education policies which try to lock-in foreign
students are detrimental for efficiency.
There are several ways to extend the analysis. Our paper focuses on the part of educational
quality that is fee-financed, neglecting the impact that it might have on the basic tax-fianced
system. In the presence of perfect credit markets and the absence of externalities this way of
financing is optimal (see Demange et al., 2008a). However, tax financing in most countries are
a matter of fact and can be seen as a means to redistribute resources in favor of students. It
would be worthwhile to allow for mixed financing by fees and taxes on wage income. With
partial tax financing countries may have a weaker incentive to compete for students since they
generate a cost factor in the government’s budget which has to be financed by skilled and
unskilled workers. This may result in a differentiation more closely to the optimal one when
not all foreign students return home. Finally, another line of extensions is the introduction of
heterogeneity in the countries. One could distinguish small and large countries by incorporating
cost functions with differing fixed cost components, the smaller country with a higher fix cost
in setting up higher education. Another type of heterogeneity between countries stems from
differences in their school sectors. An improvement in school education enlarges the range of
abilities. In terms of our model this means that countries differ in their top ability type of
students. The heterogeneity of countries presumably modifies the outcome of competition for
students. We leave those extensions for future research.
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5 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2 Let eA > eB . We have
TW (eA, eB) = ws
[
2
(
y − yAB) y + yAB
2
eA + 2
(
yAB − yu) yAB + yu
2
eB
]
+4wuyu − 2
(
y − yAB) c (eA)− 2 (yAB − yu) c (eB) .
The derivative of this expression with respect to eA is the sum of a direct effect on the
current students,
(
y − yAB) [ws (y + yAB)− 2c′(eA)], and an indirect effect due to the change
in the threshold yAB . The indirect effect is null because there is no distortion in individuals’
choices. This can be checked as follows. The indirect effect is equal to
2
∂yAB
∂e
[−wsyABeA + c(eA) + wsyABeB − c(eB)].
The term in brackets is null because individuals split voluntarily across countries according to
wsy
ABeA − c(eA) = wsyABeB − c(eB) whatever the educational levels are. We are left with
the direct effect. Taking the limit when eA tends to eB = e, yAB tends to ylim = c
′(e)
ws
. Thus
the direct effect
(
y − yAB) [ws (y + yAB)− 2c′(eA)] tends to ws (y − c′(e)ws )2, which is equal to
limeA→e+ ∂TW∂eA (e
A, e), as given in (29).
Consider now the derivative of TW with respect to eB with eB < eA. It is the sum of the
direct effect,
(
yAB − yu) [ws (yAB + yu)− 2c′ (eB)] and indirect effects due to the changes in
the thresholds yAB and yu. The indirect effect due to the change in yAB vanishes by the same
argument as above. Similarly, the marginal indirect effect due to the change in yu is null because
there is no distortion in individuals’ choices. This is checked since the indirect effect is
∂yu
∂e
[−wsyueB + c(eB) + 2wu]
and the term in square brackets is null. Again we are left with the direct effect only. Taking
the limit as eB tends to eA = e, the direct effect
(
yAB − yu) [ws (yAB + yu)− 2c′ (eB)] tends
to
(
ylim − yu) (ws (ylim + yu)−2c′ (e)) and using wsylim = c′ (e) gives limeB→<e ∂TW∂eB (e, eB) =
−ws
(
c′(e)
ws
− yu
)2
as given in (29).
Furthermore, setting the direct effects equal to zero a comparison with optimality conditions
in (16) shows that maximal total welfare is achieved with eA = e∗ and eB = e∗. .
Proof of Proposition 1 Let eA > eB . Country A chooses its educational level by maximizing
the natives’ welfare from (30). Differentiating the concave welfare function with respect to eA
yields the first-order condition:
∂WA|pi=1
∂eA
=
(
y − yAB) [ws y + yAB2 − c′ (eA)
]
(39)
+
∂yAB
∂eA
[
wse
ByAB − c (eB)− (wseAyAB − c (eA))]
= 0
From Lemma 1 we know that students partition themselves optimally across both countries
so that wseByAB − c
(
eB
)
= wseAyAB − c
(
eA
)
. Hence, country A’s educational level is deter-
mined by the condition ws y+y
AB
2 = c
′ (eA) which is the optimal educational level according to
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(16). The welfare maximum of country B is given by
∂WB|pi=1
∂eB
=
(
yAB − yu) [ws yAB + yu2 − c′ (eB)
]
(40)
+
∂yAB
∂eB
[
wse
ByAB − c (eB)− (wseAyAB − c (eA))]
− ∂y
u
∂eB
[
wse
Byu − c (eB)− 2wu]
= 0.
From Lemma 1 again, students split optimally across countries according to (18) and the
lower ability types of individuals divide optimally in remaining unskilled and receiving higher
education in country B: wseByu− c
(
eB
)
= 2wu. Hence, the educational level chosen by country
B is given by ws y
AB+yu
2 = c
′ (eB) which is optimal according to condition (16).
Since the voluntary partition of both students between countries and unskilled and skilled
labor is optimal whatever the educational level is, countries choose always the optimally differ-
entiated educational levels and the Nash equilibrium is unique.
Proof of Lemma 3 The sum of the welfare in the two countries associated to two education
levels, eA, eB is given by the total welfare function:
TW (eA, eB) = [WA|pi=0 +W
B
|pi=0](e
A, eB)
= ws
[
2
(
y − yAB) y + yAB
2
eA + 2
(
yAB − yu) yAB + yu
2
eB
]
+ 4wuyu − 2
(
y − yAB) c (eA)− 2 (yAB − yu) c (eB) .
TW is continuous. Taking the limit as eA and eB tend to e, we obtain
lim
eA→e−,eB→e+
WA|pi=0(e
A, eB) + lim
eA→e−,eB→e+
WB|pi=0(e
A, eB) = TW (e, e). (41)
By symmetry WA|pi=0(e
A, eB) = WB|pi=0(e
B , eA) and 2WA|pi=0(e, e) = 2W
B
|pi=0(e, e) = TW (e, e).
This gives
lim
eA→e−,eB→e+
WB|pi=0(e
A, eB) = lim
eA→e+,eB→e−
WA|pi=0(e
A, eB) (42)
Plugging (42) into (41)
lim
eA→e−,eB→e+
WA|pi=0(e
A, eB) + lim
eA→e+,eB→e−
WA|pi=0(e
A, eB) = TW (e, e) (43)
Taking eB = e in the above equation gives equation (35).
Since the jumps are in the same direction, jumps must be null at a symmetric equilibrium:
if the jump is positive at (e, e), a country benefits by proposing a level higher than e and if it is
negative it benefits by proposing a smaller one.
Proof of Proposition 2 Let us determine the best response of a country, say A, to the
educational level chosen by the other country. Given eB = e, consider WA(eA, e) as a function
of eA. We need to distinguish three cases depending on eA being smaller than, equal to, or
larger than e. Also we want both countries to have students, which requires yu < yAB < y. The
first inequality holds true if c
′(e)
ws
> 2wu+c(e))wse (cf. (18) and (19)), i.e. for c(e) = e
2 if e2 > 2wu.
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1) As long as eA < eB = e, country A attracts students with low ability, i.e., between yu(eA)
and yAB . The derivative is (cf. (38) where the roles of A and B are exchanged and where we
use [−yueAws + wu + c
(
eA
)
] = −wu)
∂WA
∂eA
= 2
(
yAB − yu) [ws yAB + yu2 − c′(eA)
]
(44)
+2[yABeAws − c
(
eA
)
]
∂yAB
∂eA
− 2wu ∂y
u
∂eA
for eA < eB .
Check that with a quadratic cost function, the derivative is linear in eA and increasing: A prefers
to be as close as possible to e in this zone.Therefore if the country prefers to be the one with the
lowest level its best response is ’almost’ to match the other country’s level e. Furthermore, this
implies that there is no asymmetric equilibrium since the country with the lower educational
level increases its welfare by increasing its level.
2) Consider the zone with eA > e. We have
∂WA
∂eA
= 2
(
y − yAB) [ws y + yAB2 − c′(eA)
]
− 2[yABeAws − c
(
eA
)
]
∂yAB
∂eA
(45)
for eA > eB .
The derivative is null at an ’interior’ best response, one that is indeed above e. Check that with
a quadratic cost function the best response is decreasing with e (write ∂W
A
∂eA
= 0 and impose
the solution to be larger than e). The minimum ability level of those who decide to study yu
depends only on the minimum educational level. Thus it is continuous and stays constant for
eA larger than e.
3) We need to examine carefully the behavior when eA is close to e because of discontinuities.
We know that the limit of yAB when eA tends to e is ylim(e) given by (27):
Let us denote by D(e) the jump on A’s welfare as eA approaches e = eB from above:
D(e) = limeA→e+ WA|pi=0(e
A, e)− 12TW (e, e). Since WA|pi=0 +WB|pi=0 = TW , we have
[WA|pi=0 −
1
2
TW ](eA, eB) =
1
2
[WA|pi=0 −WB|pi=0](eA, eB).
¿From (31) and (32) the value 12 [W
A
|pi=0 −WB|pi=0](eA, eB) for eA > eB is
(y − yAB)
[
ws
y + yAB
2
eA − c (eA)]− (yAB − yu) [ws yAB + yu2 eB − c(eB)
]
where yAB is function of eA and eB and yu of eB . D(e) is obtained by taking the limit when eA
tends to e = eB from above. Since yAB tends to ylim(e), and yu is equal to yu(e) = 2wu+c(e)wse ,
we obtain
D(e) =
(
y − ylim(e)) [ws y + ylim(e)2 e− c (e)
]
− (ylim(e)− yu(e)) [ws ylim(e) + yu(e)2 e− c(e)
]
For c(e) = αe2, wsylim(e) = 2αe hence ws y
lim
2 e− c(e) = 0. Thus
D(e) =
ws
2
e[
(
y − ylim(e)) y − (ylim(e)− yu(e)) yu(e)] (46)
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D(e) is of the same sign as the term in brackets. This term is positive at e∗ (as we know from
the text or directly using that
(
y − ylim(e)) = (ylim(e)− yu(e)) at e∗). It is negative for e large
enough so that ylim(e) equals to y). Furthermore, the term decreases with e because ylim(e)
increases;
(
ylim − yu) = 1ws (αe− wue ) increases, and yu(e) = 2wu+αe2wse increases. Hence there is
a unique value eˆ for which D(eˆ) = 0, and furthermore this value is larger than e∗.
At ê level, the net benefit from educating high ability students, those with ability larger than
yAB , is exactly equal to the net benefit from educating low ability students, those with ability
between yAB and yu.
Consider a value e larger than ê. No country benefits by improving the educational level.
Each benefits from choosing an educational level just below the other one. Similarly, for a value
e smaller than ê, a country benefits by improving the educational level above e. We are left
with (ê, ê) as the only possibility for an equilibrium in pure strategies.
We determine conditions under which (ê, ê) is indeed an equilibrium. Take eB = ê, and
consider the welfare of A, for example (by symmetry the same argument works for B). A’s
welfare is continuous at ê. Furthermore it increases for eA < ê. Hence, if A’s welfare decreases
for eA > ê, ê is indeed a best response to eB = ê and (ê, ê) is an equilibrium. Recall that
a country’s welfare is concave when it has the largest education level. Therefore, A’s welfare
decreases for e > ê if and only if the ’right’ derivative limeA→>e ∂W
A
∂eA
is negative (since, in that
case, the concavity of WA for e > ê implies that ∂W
A
∂eA
is negative for e > ê and, hence, A’s
welfare decreases).
Proof of Proposition 3 Countries maximize welfare
W I(eA, eB) = (1− pi)W I|pi=0 + piW I|pi=1(eA, eB) I = A,B. (26)
We evaluate the partial derivatives of the welfare functions W I at (e∗, e∗), that is assuming
that countries provide the optimally differentiated educational levels eA = e∗ and eB = e∗.
From (26), these partial derivatives are a combination of the partial derivatives of W I|pi=0 and
W I|pi=1, I = A,B.
The derivatives
∂WA|pi=1
∂eA
(e∗, e∗) and
∂WB|pi=1
∂eB
(e∗, e∗) are null because optimal differentiation
levels form a Nash equilibrium (Proposition 1). Thus
∂WA
∂eA
(e∗, e∗) = (1− pi)∂W
A
pi=0
∂eA
(e∗, e∗)
and similarly for B. Expressions (37) and (38) give
∂WA|pi=0
∂eA
(eA, eB) = 2
(
y − yAB) [ws y + yAB2 − c′(eA)
]
+ 2[yABeAws − c
(
eA
)
](−∂y
AB
∂eA
)
∂WB|pi=0
∂eB
(eA, eB) = 2
(
yAB − yu) [ws yAB + yu2 − c′(eB)
]
+ 2[yABeBws − c
(
eB
)
]
∂yAB
∂eB
+2[yueBws − wu − c
(
eB
)
](− ∂y
u
∂eB
).
At (e∗, e∗), the first terms in squared brackets in (37) and (38), which represent the efficiency
gains, are zero.
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The second term in (37) is negative since [yABeAws − c
(
eA
)
] > 0 and
∂yAB
∂eA
=
c′
(
eA
)− wsyAB
ws (eA − eB) > 0.
Hence, country A’s welfare increases if eA decreases below e∗.
The second term in (38) is positive since [yABeBws − c
(
eB
)
] > 0 and
∂yAB
∂eB
=
wsy
AB − c′ (eB)
ws (eA − eB) > 0.
The third term in (38) is negative since [−yueBws +wu + c
(
eB
)
] = −wu by definition of yu
(see (19)). And at eB = e∗ we get:
∂yu
∂eB
∣∣∣∣
eB=e∗
=
c′
(
eB
)− wsyu
wseB
> 0
because c′
(
eB
)
= ws y
AB+yu
2 > wsy
u. An educational level eB higher than e∗ is welfare improv-
ing for country B if and only if[
[yABeBws − c
(
eB
)
]
∂yAB
∂eB
− wu ∂y
u
∂eB
]
eB=e∗
> 0. (47)
We compare both terms factorwise. First we have yABeBws − c
(
eB
)
> yueBws − c
(
eB
)
=
2wu > wu. Second we show that ∂y
AB
∂eB
> ∂y
u
∂eB
if eB > e
A
2 at the optimal differentiation. For
the following calculation we use that the optimally differentiated educational level eB satisfies
c′
(
eB
)
= ws y
AB+yu
2 :
wsy
AB − c′ (eB)
ws (eA − eB) −
c′
(
eB
)− wsyu
wseB
=
1
(eA − eB)wseB
[(
eB − e
A
2
)
ws
(
yAB − yu)] .
If eB > e
A
2 we have
∂yAB
∂eB
> ∂y
u
∂eB
which proves the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4 Consider the unique candidate for a symmetric equilibrium, (eˆ, eˆ).
By definition of eˆ, a country’s objective is continuous at eˆ with respect to its educational level.
However, there is typically a kink, that is the right and left derivatives do not coincide. Take
eB = eˆ, and consider A welfare for example (by symmetry the same argument works for B).
An equilibrium is obtained at (eˆ, eˆ) only if the left derivative is nonnegative and the right one
is non positive, i.e.
lim
eA→<eˆ
∂WA|pi
∂eA
(eA, eˆ) ≥ 0 and lim
eA→>eˆ
∂WA|pi
∂eA
(eA, eˆ) ≤ 0. (48)
Assume there is scope for differentiation at eˆ. Then conditions (48) are never satisfied at pi = 1.
More precisely, since WA|pi=1(e
A, eB) is half total welfare TW (eA, eB), we know from lemma 2
that
lim
eA→<eˆ
∂WA|pi=1
∂eA
(eA, eˆ) ≤ 0, and lim
eA→>eˆ
∂WA|pi=1
∂eA
(eA, eˆ) ≥ 0.
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Consider now a return probability pi < 1. A country’s objective criterion is a combination
of the criterion that obtains in the two extreme cases. Thus we have for eA 6= eˆ
∂WA|pi
∂eA
(eA, eˆ) = (1− pi)
∂WA|pi=0
∂eA
(eA, eˆ) + pi
∂WA|pi=1
∂eA
(eA, eˆ) (49)
and the same convex combination applies at the limit when eA tends to eˆ alternatively for
eA > eˆ and eA < eˆ. Assume that the first inequality in (48) holds for pi < 1. Since
limeA→<eˆ
∂WA|pi=1
∂eA
(eA, eˆ) ≤ 0 it must be that limeA→<eˆ ∂W
A
|pi=0
∂eA
(eA, eˆ) is positive. Decreasing pi in-
creases the weight on this positive term and decreases on the negative one: surely limeA→<eˆ
∂WA|pi=1
∂eA
(eA, eˆ) >
0 for smaller pi. Similarly, if the second inequality (48) holds for pi < 1 it holds for any smaller
value for pi. This proves Proposition 4.
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